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NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW OF FOREIGN MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS OF DOMESTIC COMPANIES IN CHINA AND THE 
UNITED STATES   
  
Kenneth Y. Hui ∗
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
China’s recently enacted Anti-Monopoly Law has received much academic attention. 
In particular, many articles and comments have been written about Article 31 of the 
Anti-Monopoly Law, a provision on national security review of foreign mergers and 
acquisitions of domestic companies. The provision has often been labelled as 
draconian and protectionist. This paper argues that Article 31 is not necessarily so. 
Article 31 is actually, to a large extent, in line with the national security provisions 
found in liberal economies. By taking a comparative approach, this paper will 
demonstrate the similarities between the national security laws in China and the 
United States, challenging common misconceptions.  
 
  
The recent enactment of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (the “Anti-Monopoly Law”) 
has provided a source of discussion for many academics and journalists.  In particular, 
the national security review provision under the Anti Monopoly Law has received 
                                                 
∗ LL.M. Candidate 2009, Cornell Law School. P.C.LL., University of Hong Kong; LL.B. London 
School of Economics and Political Science. I would like to thank Kenneth Kuk, Jenny Kung, Platon 
Gatsinos and Cherry Cao for their assistance and support in writing this paper.  
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much attention. Under Article 31, foreign mergers and acquisitions of domestic 
enterprises are subject to both national security and anti-monopoly reviews. Some 
commentators such as Anu Bradford have labelled Article 31 as a protectionist 
measure designed to protect domestic companies from foreign investors. 1 They also 
assert that the vagueness and uncertainty surrounding the concept of national security 
in Article 31 allows room for abuse and protectionist policies. This paper argues that 
the concept of a national security review in China is not new. The review of foreign 
mergers and acquisitions of domestic companies has already been in operation since 
2006 under the Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by 
Foreign Investors (the “2006 Provisions”).2
 
II. AIMS OF THIS PAPER  
 
 Contrary to popular belief, both Article 
31 of the Anti-Monopoly Law and the 2006 Provisions are not outright protectionist 
measures in a comparative context. In fact, it echoes national security review laws 
found in free market economies, such as the United States.  
The aim of this paper is to argue against labelling China’s national security laws on 
foreign mergers and acquisitions of domestic companies (the “national security laws”) 
as protectionist. To demonstrate this point, this paper will embark on a comparative 
approach to show that China’s national security laws are actually in line with 
corresponding laws in free market countries. Given that the United States is often 
regarded as the prime free market example, this paper will compare the national 
                                                 
1 Anu Bradford, Chinese Antitrust Law: The New Face of Protectionism?, THE HUFFINGTON 
POST August 1 2008. See also Dale Oesterle, China gets tough on foreign investment, BUSINESS 
LAW PROFESSOR BLOG, August 30 2006 
 
2 Steve Dickinson, National Security Review Under China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law, CHINA 
LAW BLOG, August 29 2008  
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security laws of China and the United States. It will be argued that the laws in China 
and the United States are in fact substantially similar. Accordingly, China’s policies 
are not necessarily more protectionist than those in a free market economy. Hence, 
Bradford’s candid and unqualified argument must be wrong.  
 
For the purposes of this paper, the national security laws discussed will be limited to 
the rules on foreign mergers, acquisitions and takeovers of domestic enterprises. In 
this paper the terms merger, acquisition and takeover will be used synonymously. The 
focus will be on transactions where one company (itself or through its wholly owned 
subsidiaries) purchases a majority of the shares or substantial assets of another 
company. The target company then ceases to exist. Although the Anti-Monopoly Law 
and the 2006 Provisions also cover other forms of foreign investments in domestic 
enterprises, these rules will not be taken into account. 
 
Part III of this paper introduces the legislative development behind China’s national 
security laws. Part IV explains the review process for proposed foreign acquisitions 
of domestic companies. Since the review process does not hinder foreign mergers and 
acquisitions per se, such discussion will be brief. Parts V and VI examine the scope 
of the national security laws in China and the United States and demonstrate their 
similarities. Part VII compares the remedies available to the state in China and the 
United States and demonstrates their similarities. Finally Part VIII examines the 
decision making procedure in both countries.  
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III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CHINA’S NATIONAL SECURITY LAWS 
 
Foreign direct investment in China has grown at an alarming rate in the past ten years.  
In particular, foreign mergers and acquisitions of domestic companies, as a 
percentage of China’s total foreign direct investment, grew from 5 percent in 2003 to 
20 percent in 2005.3 The Fair Trade Bureau in 2004 published a report accounting 
that foreign companies such as Microsoft and Tetra Pak have monopolized their 
respective markets in China. 4  These developments put pressure on China’s 
government to control and protect its economy from foreign control.5
 
 As an interim 
response, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (now the 
Ministry of Commerce), the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, the 
State Administration of Taxation and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
jointly promulgated the Provisional Rules on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors (the “2003 Provisional Rules”).  
Despite the 2003 Provisional Rules, mergers and acquisitions of domestic enterprises 
by foreign investors continued to rise. In between June 2005 and 2006, foreign 
purchasers acquired over 250 domestic enterprises worth more than US$14 billion.6
                                                 
3 See Anti-Monopoly Law Seeks to Regulate Foreign Acquisitions, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE 
NEWS RELEASE, July 5 2007  
 
4  See The Competition Restriction Behaviour of Multinational Companies in China 
Countermeasures, FAIR TRADE BUREAU, May 2004  
 
5 Wang Xiaoye, Report: Anti-monopoly Law Vital, CHINA DAILY, August 22 2004  
 
 
Further, of the 21 acquisitions in the first six months of 2006, 18 involved foreign 
companies acquiring domestic companies and only 3 involved the acquisition of 
6 See UK spent $3.5 billion in China M&A takeaway, GRANT THORNTON, August 15 2006. See 
the Grant Thornton website at http://www.grant-thornton.co.uk  
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foreign companies.7 Rising concern over the loss of state-owned assets combined 
with Carlyle Group’s attempt to purchase a subsidiary of Xugong Group, China's 
construction and machinery giant, prompted further state intervention.8  Eventually, 
in August 2006, six PRC authorities, the Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”), the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, 
the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, the State Administration of 
Taxation, the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange jointly promulgated the 2006 Provisions.9
Recently, the Standing Committee of the 10th National People's Congress (“NPC”) 
adopted the Anti-Monopoly Law, which came into force on August 1 2008. The 
national security provision of the Anti-Monopoly Law, Article 31, states that “where 
a foreign investor mergers and acquires a domestic enterprise …, if state security is 
involved, besides the examination on the concentration in accordance with this Law, 
the examination on national security shall also be conducted in accordance with the 
relevant State provisions.” Contrary to popular belief, Article 31 does not in fact add 
anything new. Article 31 reiterates the applicability of existing national security laws 
 The 2006 Provisions 
expanded the scope of national security and offered more comprehensive guidelines 
regarding the review procedure.  
 
                                                 
7 See interview of Sun Xiaohua, CHINA BUSINESS NEWS, July 17 2006 
 
8  See China to revise regulation on foreign mergers and acquisitions, MINISTRY OF 
COMMERCE NEWS RELEASE, July 18 2006   
 
9 Decree of the Ministry of Commerce, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council, the State Administration of Taxation, the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce, Securities Regulatory Commission of China, and the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange No. 10 
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rather than adding new provisions. As such, the more detailed 2006 Provisions 
remains as legal authority on foreign takeovers of domestic companies.10
The historical development of United States national security laws is by large similar 
to the development of Chinese national security laws. It was also triggered by 
increasing foreign direct investment and acquisition of domestic companies. In the 
late 1970s, Congress became concerned with the rapid increase in Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) investments in American portfolio assets.
 
  
11 
As a result, President Gerald Ford created the Committee of Foreign Investment in 
the United States (“CFIUS”) in 1975 to placate Congress.12 CFIUS, at the time, was 
tasked with monitoring the impact of foreign investments in the United States. 13 
Subsequently in the late 1980’s, increasing acquisition of United States firms by 
Japanese firms led to the passage of the Exon-Florio provision by Congress.14 The 
Exon-Florio provision granted the President authority to block foreign acquisitions of 
persons engaged in United States interstate commerce.15
                                                 
10 Dickinson, National Security Review Under China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law  
 
11 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Consumer, and Monetary Affairs. The Operations of Federal Agencies in Monitoring, Reporting on, 
and Analyzing Foreign Investments in the United States. Hearings. 96th Cong., 1st sess., Part 3, July 30, 
1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979, at pp.334-335 
 
12 Matthew R. Byrne, Protecting National Security and Promoting Foreign Investment: Maintain 
the Exon-Florio Balance, 67 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 849 (2006) 
 
13 Executive Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 159 (1976) 
 
14 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Energy and Commerce. Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness. Foreign Takeovers and National Security. Hearings on 
Section 905 of H.R.3. 100th Cong., 1st sess., October 20, 1987. Testimony of David C. Mulford. 
Washington, U.S. Govt., Print., Off., 1988, at pp. 21-22.  
 
15 Omnibus Trade and Competitivness Act §5021 
 
 Through Executive Order 
12,661, President Ronald Reagan then delegated power to CFIUS, transforming it 
from an administrative body to a Committee that could investigate, review and make 
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recommendations. 16  The Exon-Florio provision has since been amended again in 
response to the acquisition of LTV Steel’s missile division, a United States company, 
by Thomson CTF, a company owned by the French government. 17
IV. REVIEW PROCESS  
 The Byrd 
Amendment added a section requiring mandatory investigation by CFIUS if a United 
States company is being acquired by a foreign state owned enterprise.  
 
 
Under Article 12 of the 2006 Provisions, the burden on initiating the review process 
is on the foreign investor. If the acquisition “involves any critical industry, affects or 
may affect the security of national economy, or causes transference of actual control 
over the domestic enterprise who possesses a resound trademark or China's time-
honored brand,” then foreign investors must make an application to MOFCOM. 
Although there are some precedents to aid foreign investors in their judgment, it 
remains difficult for foreign investors to second-guess MOFCOM. 18 In practice, 
foreign investors will take a cautious approach in assessing whether they should make 
an application.19
To apply for a security review under the 2006 Provisions, the foreign investor must 
submit a list of documents including the target company’s shareholders resolution, an 
application for a merged company to be established as a foreign investment enterprise, 
  
 
                                                 
16 Executive Order No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618 (1989)  
 
17 Byrne, Protecting National Security and Promoting Foreign Investment: Maintain the Exon-
Florio Balance 
 
18 Ibid. 
 
19 Dickinson, National Security Review Under China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law  
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the Articles of Association of the foreign investment enterprise established after the 
merger and any other relevant government permits to the approving authority. 20 
Under the 2006 Provisions, MOFCOM has been assigned as the approving 
authority.21 Upon receipt of all the required documents, MOFCOM has thirty days to 
decide whether or not to grant the approval.22
Under the Exon-Florio provision, a review is triggered by either party, by the 
President or a member of the CFIUS requesting CFIUS to commence a review.
 If MOFCOM decides to grant the 
approval, it shall then issue a certificate of approval.  
 
23 A 
further 45 day investigation is necessary if the acquiring firm is “controlled by or 
acting on behalf of a foreign government” and the transaction could result in control 
of a United States company affecting national security. 24  Subsequent to the 
investigation, CFIUS then produces an opinion for the President, who then has 15 
days to consider whether to approve the transaction.25
V. SCOPE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW  
  
 
 
The scope of the national security laws in China and in the United States are 
relatively similar. Article 31 of the Anti-Monopoly Law covers situations where a 
“foreign investor mergers and acquires a domestic enterprise” resulting in actual 
                                                 
20 Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, Article 21  
 
21 Ibid., Article 10  
 
22 Ibid., Article 25  
 
23 50 U.S.C.§2170(a)  
 
24 50 U.S.C.§2170(b) 
 
25 50 U.S.C. §2170(d) 
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control of the domestic enterprise. 26 The Exon-Florio provision, although worded 
differently, contains a similar concept. Under the provision, investigations by CFIUS 
may only be made where there are “mergers, acquisitions and takeovers … by or with 
foreign persons which could result in foreign control of persons engaged in interstate 
commerce in the United States.”27
The term foreign investor is undefined in the 2006 Provisions. The Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Foreign Capital Enterprises (the “Foreign Capital 
Laws”), however, provides some guidance. Foreign investors are defined as foreign 
enterprises or individuals, with the litmus test being the nationality of the enterprise 
or individual.
 In the following section, the key elements defining 
the scope of national security reviews in China and the United States will be 
compared. The discussion on the definition of “national security” will be left to Part 
VI. 
 
(a) Foreign investor  
 
28 In addition, the 2006 Provisions provide two further situations where 
the acquiring entity is defined as a foreign investor. Firstly, the 2006 Provisions also 
applies to foreign invested enterprises; enterprises with 25 percent of its equities held 
by foreign investors that are of an investment nature.29
                                                 
26 Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, Article 12  
 
2750 U.S.C. §2170(a); Also note that such investigations are compulsory under the Byrd amendment 
if “an entity controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government seeks to engage in any merger, 
acquisition, or takeover which could result in the control of a person engaged in interstate commerce in 
the United States that could affect the national security of the United States,” 50 U.S.C. app. §2170(b)  
 
28 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Foreign Capital Enterprises, Article 1  
 
29 Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, Article 55 
 
 Secondly, a special purpose 
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vehicle, meaning an overseas company directly or indirectly controlled by a domestic 
company or a natural person, may also fall under the 2006 Provisions.30
This definition is relatively similar to the corresponding definition under the Exon-
Florio provision. The Code of Federal Regulations (the “Regulations”) also uses a 
nationality test to delineate a foreign person. A foreign person is defined as “any 
foreign national or any entity over which control is exercised or exercisable by 
foreign interest.”
  
 
31
The biggest difference between the scope of the Chinese and the United States 
national security review process is the definition of a target company. Under the 2006 
Provisions, a target company is defined as a domestic enterprise with “no foreign 
 Like the 2006 Provisions, this definition covers acquisitions by 
foreign companies incorporated abroad. In addition, it also covers acquisitions by 
domestic companies under the control of a foreign national or entity. Given that 
“control” is given a broad definition under the Regulations, it includes situations 
where a shareholder has a minority interest but much actual influence. As such a 
company like a foreign invested enterprise, with 25 percent of its shares held by 
foreign investors, can be a foreign person if there is control. In fact, the Exon-Florio 
test is potentially wider than the 2006 Provisions. By using the concept of “control”, a 
company with less than 25 percent of its shares held by a foreign investor can become 
a foreign person.  
 
(b) Domestic enterprise  
 
                                                 
30 Ibid., Article 39 
 
31 31 C.F.R. §800.213  
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investment.” 32  Although the language here suggests of a Chinese entity with no 
foreign investment at all, the definition seems to be wider when applied. A domestic 
enterprise has been interpreted by academics to mean a non foreign invested 
enterprise (an entity with less than 25 percent of its ordinary shares held by a foreign 
entity). 33
In contrast, the definition of a target company is much wider in the United States. The 
target can be any “person engaged in interstate commerce.”
   
 
34 The target does not 
have to be a domestic company. A far-reaching consequence of this definition is that 
the target entity does not require a particularly strong connection with the United 
States. All that is required is that the person conducts business in the United States. 
An example can be seen in the proposed acquisition of Peninsular and Oriental Steam 
Navigation Company (“P&O”), a British company, by Dubai Ports World (“DPW”), 
a state owned company in the United Arab Emirates.35
                                                 
32 Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, Article 2  
33 Peter Neumann and Tony Zhang, China’s new foreign funded M&A provisions: greater legal 
protection or legalized protectionism?, 20 CHINA LAW AND PRACTICE 8, 2006  
 
34 A person means any natural person or entity under 31 C.F.R. §800.217 
 
35 David E. Sanger and Eric Lipton, Bush Would Veto Any Bill Halting Dubai Port Deal, N.Y. 
TIMES, February 22 2006  
 
 The issue here was that P&O 
operated and managed terminals at five United States ports. Since P&O managed port 
facilities in multiple states, including New York, New Jersey, Philadelphia, Baltimore 
and New Orleans, the deal fell within review jurisdiction – even though P&O was not 
a United States company. This example, if anything, suggests that the Exon-Florio 
review process is more stringent and more protectionist than the 2006 Provisions. 
With the 2006 Provisions, the national security rules can only be invoked if a 
domestic company is invoked.  
12 
 
VI. DEFINITION OF “NATIONAL SECURITY” 
 
Article 31 of the Anti-Monopoly Act articulates that a review is required when 
“national security” is involved. The article does not elaborate further on what national 
security means and how it is to be applied. It seems that the Anti-Monopoly Act 
follows the 2006 Provisions for the definition of national security. Article 12 of the 
2006 Provisions provides that mergers and acquisitions that (1) involves any critical 
industry, (2) affects or may affect the security of national economy, or (3) causes 
transference of actual control over the domestic enterprise which possesses a resound 
trademark or China's time-honored brand is subject to review.  
 
In contrast, the Exon-Florio provision takes a different emphasis. The President may 
only intervene in a transaction if he believes “that the foreign interest exercising 
control might take action that threatens to impair the national security” and that other 
provisions of law do not provide adequate and appropriate authority to protect the 
national security in the matter.36 There are twelve factors that the President must 
consider when deciding to block a foreign acquisition.37
                                                 
36 50 U.S.C. §2170(e)  
 
 The factors cited mostly 
revolve around the issue of national security. Thus, unlike the 2006 Provisions, none 
37 The factors include: (1) domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements; 
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense requirements; (3) 
control of domestic industries by foreign citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the United 
States to meet the requirements of nationals security; (4) potential effects of the proposed or pending 
transaction … identified by the Secretary of Defense as posing a military threat to the interests of the 
United States; (5) the potential effects of the transaction on United States technological leadership in 
areas affecting U.S. national security; (6) whether the transaction has a security related impact on 
critical infrastructure in the United States; (7) the potential effects on United States critical 
infrastructure, including major energy assets; (8) the potential effects on United States critical 
technologies; (9) whether the transaction is a foreign government controlled transaction;  ….  (11) the 
long term projection of the United States requirements for sources of energy and other critical 
resources and materials; and (12) such other factors as the President or the Committee determine to be 
appropriate.  
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of the factors make explicit reference to “critical industries” or “national economic 
security.” As Steve Dickinson points out, the main difference between the security 
provisions of both countries is that one focuses on the economy while the other 
focuses on national security.38
(a) Critical industry  
 
 
While in theory, the Chinese national security laws are aligned with the concepts of 
economic and industrial security, the disparity is not as big as it first seems. In 
practice, the 2006 Provisions and the Exon-Florio provision produce the same result. 
A closer examination of the key provisions suggests that they are applied in the same 
way.  
 
 
The notion of “critical industry” in China has in fact been applied in a way that covers 
national security. Although the concept of critical industry is undefined in the Anti-
Monopoly Law and the 2006 Provisions, the State Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (“SASAC”) has in the past highlighted several key 
sectors critical to the national industry. They are the armaments, power generation 
and distribution, oil and petrochemicals, telecommunications, coal, aviation and 
shipping industries. 39
                                                 
38 Dickinson, National Security Review Under China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law 
 
39Zhao Huanxin, China names key industries for absolute state control, CHINA DAILY, December 
19 2006 
 It is unsurprising that these industries are listed. These 
industries are the backbone of China’s economy and livelihood. Since China is 
heavily based on natural resources and industrial production, these industries are the 
ones that will have most bearing on its national security and will be protected most. 
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An example of this is the protection of the steel industry from foreigners. Arcelor 
Mittal’s attempt to acquire Laiwu Iron and Steel Corporation in 2006 was blocked for 
a year and a half because of the National and Development Reform Commission’s 
objection. The Commission expressed that it was concerned with the deal’s pricing 
and the steel market’s development. Apart from being in SASAC’s defined categories, 
an additional factor seems to be necessary for state intervention. For example, 
Singapore Airlines’ bid for China Eastern Airlines in 2006 clearly fell into the 
aviation category. Despite the deal ultimately falling through because of commercial 
reasons, the transaction was actually given support by MOFCOM and other 
government authorities. This suggests that a national security test is implicit in the 
critical industry test; reinforcing similarities with the Exon-Florio provision.  
 
In practice, the only major difference between the application of the Exon-Florio 
provision and the 2006 Provisions is where the emphasis of protection lies. While 
China focuses on primary industries like manufacturing and natural resources, the 
United States focuses on defense and technology.40
                                                 
40  Edward M. Graham and David M. Marchick, U.S. National Security and Foreign Direct 
Investment, (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 2006) at p. 54 
 
 The reason for this is that the 
economic structure of the United States is different from China’s, with a greater 
emphasis on information and technology. A recent example of this is Hutchison 
Whampoa Limited’s offer for Global Crossing, a fiber optic network. CFIUS’ 
concern about the security of United States data transmissions and the ability of 
United States law enforcement’s ability to access the network for wiretap led to the 
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initiation of an extended 45 day investigation. Seeing this as a negative sign, 
Hutchison Whampoa Limited withdrew its offer.41
Despite denials by officials, the concept of national economic security is actually 
incorporated into the United States national security laws. In theory, national 
economic security and national security cannot be distinct from one another. National 
economic security is a subset of national security. A country’s economy will 
undoubtedly have a major influence in its foreign relations, trade, development and 
defence spending. It follows then that the Exon-Florio national security test must at 
least incorporate some economic elements into its analysis. The factors listed under 
the Regulations provide traces of this. For instance, the factors cite that the 
acquisition of major assets in the energy sector may be of national concern. The 
leading transaction for this was the proposed acquisition of Union Oil Corporation of 
California by the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (“CNOOC”), a state 
owned company in 2005. CNOOC, under political pressure, pulled out of the deal 
before a CFIUS review as there was wide consensus that CFIUS would come to a 
negative outcome. Various lobbyists have argued that the deal would impact on the 
United States’ oil dependence.
  
 
(b) Security of national economy  
 
42
                                                 
41 It also depends on whether the national security element can be alleviated. The acquisition of 
Tyco International, another fiber optical company, by Videsh Sanchar Nigram Ltd (an Indian company) 
in 2005 was approved because VSNL was able to alleviate national security fears by entering into a 
data security arrangement.  
 
42 See Testimony of Guy Cariso, before the Commission on US-China Economic and Security 
Review hearing on China’s Energy Needs and Strategies, October 30 2003  
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Another factor that seems to include economic considerations in the Exon-Florio 
provision is the critical infrastructure factor. A transaction that has a security related 
impact on critical infrastructure may be subject to review. Critical infrastructure has 
been referred to and includes economic sectors such as aircraft, telecommunications, 
financial services, water and transportation. 43 This interpretation has been further 
expanded by the Department of Homeland Security through a series of Directives.44 
The widening definition of critical infrastructure implies that the Exon-Florio 
provision has the capability to consider economic matters. 45
(c) Resound trademark or time-honored brand  
  It seems then, that the 
Exon-Florio provision covers the same matters, if not more, than the 2006 Provisions.   
 
 
Many critics have also commentated that the inclusion of “resound trademark or 
China's time-honored brand” as a ground of refusal to be protectionist.46
                                                 
43 42 U.S.C. §5195c(b)(2)  
 
44 Sectors include (1) Agriculture and Food; (2) Defense Industrial Base; (3) Energy; (4) Public 
Health and Healthcare; (5) National Monuments and Icons; (6) Banking and Finance; (7) Drinking 
Water and Water Treatment Systems; (8) Chemical; (9) Commercial Facilities; (10) Dams; (11) 
Emergency Services; (12) Commercial Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste; (13) Information 
Technology; (14) Telecommunications; (15) Postal and Shipping; (16) Transportation Systems; and 
(17) Government Facilities  
 
45 James K. Jackson, Foreign Investment, CFIUS, and Homeland Security: An Overview, CRS 
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, April 17 2008  
 
46 Peter Neumann and Tony Zhang, China’s new foreign funded M&A provisions: greater legal 
protection or legalized protectionism?  
 
 This view is 
misguided. Undeniably, the time-honored brand ground is found nowhere in the 
Exon-Florio provision, but its application is so narrow that its effect is negligible in 
practice. The threshold to establish a resound trademark or a time-honored brand is 
very high. An example of this can be seen in the Coca Cola’s pending US$2.4 billion 
takeover of China Huiyuan Juice Group Limited (“Huiyuan”). Although there were 
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rumours of a national security review, the deal was instead postponed for an anti-
monopoly review. This implicitly suggests that Huiyuan did not qualify as a resound 
trademark or a time-honored brand despite being dubbed the “leading brand in 
China’s beverage industry” and winning titles such as the “China Famous 
Trademark.47” It seems that the standard has been set so high that few domestic 
companies, if any, will be treated as having a resound trademark or a time-honored 
brand.48
The absence of a similar provision in the Exon-Florio provision can be seen in 
Lenovo Group’s acquisition of International Business Machines (“IBM”) for $1.25 
billion in 2005 and InBev’s acquisition of Anheuser-Busch for $52 billion in 2008. 
The popularity of the IBM and Anheuser-Busch brand in the United States, for 
producing well-known computers and beers respectively, did not have any influence 
in the review by CFIUS. The more difficult question however is what will happen if 
IBM and Anheuser-Busch were both Chinese companies and these transactions 
occurred in China. Theoretically, of course, the resound trademark or time-honored 
brand provision can be used to block the deals. But in practice, given the Huiyuan 
precedent, it becomes more difficult to give a firm conclusion. The similarities of the 
Anheuser-Busch and Huiyuan deals, both are well known brands acquired by a 
foreign competitor, may indicate that such hypothetical Anheuser-Busch deal will 
produce the same result. As such, the inclusion of a time-honored brand provision in 
the Chinese national security law does not actually create a substantial difference 
when compared with the Exon-Florio provision.  
  
 
                                                 
47 For information on the Huiyuan Group see http://www.huiyuan.com.cn/en/about/  
 
48 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Coca Cola’s Chinese Deal Seen as Litmus Test for M&A, THE DEAL 
BOOK, September 29 2008  
18 
 
VII. REMEDIES  
 
Despite being labelled “draconian”, the Chinese national security law remedies are 
actually similar with the Exon-Florio provision remedies. Where the parties have filed 
an application for security review, MOFCOM and the relevant authorities decides 
whether or not to grant the approval.49  If the parties fail to make an application, “the 
Ministry of Commerce may, together with other competent authorities, request the 
parties to stop the transaction, assign relevant equity or assets, or take any other 
effective actions, to eliminate the affect of the merger on the security of national 
economy.”50
Essentially, this is same as the corresponding Exon-Florio remedy. If a transaction is 
reported to the President, the President then has the authority to take no action or 
block the transaction. If a transaction is unreported, the President can still block the 
deal or make a divestiture order, epitomizing Article 12 of the 2006 Provisions. An 
example can be seen in China International Trust and Investment Corporation’s 
(“CATIC”) acquisition of MAMCO Manufacturing, an American aircraft parts 
manufacturer based in Seattle, in 1990. Although a voluntary notice was filed with 
CFIUS, the transaction was completed before CFIUS finished its review. In the end, 
President George H.W. Bush, upon the recommendation of CFIUS, ordered the 
divestiture of MAMCO by CATIC on the ground that CATIC’s strong ties with the 
 Thus, even if the parties do not file, the government can still intervene 
by blocking the deal or issuing a divestiture order if the transaction has been 
completed.  
  
                                                 
49 Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, Article 25  
 
50Ibid., Article 12  
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People’s Liberation Army of the People’s Republic of China threatened national 
security.51
The Exon-Florio provision has an additional limitation to the President’s powers. The 
President must be satisfied that “all other means, including the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, must be exhausted” or the Exon-Florio provision 
is appropriate for protecting the nation’s security.
  
 
52
There is, however, a development that has marked a difference in the two regimes. In 
an increasing number of cases, CFIUS has reached “mitigation agreements” with the 
parties either before or during the review process. Although informal agreements are 
not a new concept, the conditions, which CFIUS has imposed on the parties have 
become more innovative. An example of the terms imposed can be seen in the 
acquisition of Lucent Technologies Inc by the French based Alcatel SA in December 
2006. Before the transaction was approved by CFIUS, Alcaltel Lucent was required 
to agree to a special security arrangement that restricts Alcaltel’s access to sensitive 
work done by Lucents research arm, Bell Labs. Potentially, this allows CFIUS to 
reopen a review of the deal and overturn its approval if CFIUS believes the 
 This limitation must not be 
overstated. In practice, this limitation only requires the President to choose the best 
option in light of the circumstances. Thus, Article 25 of the 2006 Provisions actually 
corresponds to the Exon-Florio limitation. Article 25 gives the state wide discretion to 
“take any other effective action” it thinks fit. If there are alternative measures that are 
more appropriate, the Chinese authorities will undoubtedly pursue those.  
 
                                                 
51  See PRC Acquisition of U.S. Technology, THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
SELECT COMMITTEE ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY, 1999, at pp.44-45  
 
52 50 U.SC. §2170(e) 
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companies “materially failed to comply” with the arrangement terms. What this 
means is that CFIUS determination is not longer final. The review process may be 
continuous and perpetual. Compared to the traditional remedies discussed above, this 
continual monitoring condition seems to be even more onerous and protectionist.53
VIII. DECISION MAKING IN THE REVIEW PROCESS  
  
 
 
Although MOFCOM is the government authority which grants the certificate of 
approval, the decision on security review applications and remedies lie within an inter 
agency committee. A recent statement issued by the National Development and 
Reform Commission has indicated that MOFCOM will have the primary 
responsibility of processing and responding applications and the interagency review 
committee will be responsible for considering whether such applications raise 
national security concerns. Where the national security concerns are major, a ministry 
level interagency committee will consider the application. The interagency review 
committee referred to will consist of the six government bodies that promulgated the 
2006 Provisions. That is, MOFCOM, the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council, the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce, the State Administration of Taxation, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. In 
practice, it has been suggested, that unanimous approval is required to grant a 
certificate of approval.54
                                                 
53 Stephanie Kirchgaessner, US Threat to Reopen Terms of Lucent and Alcatel Deal Mergers, THE 
FINANCIAL TIMES, December 1 2006  
 
54 Peter Neumann and Tony Zhang, China’s new foreign funded M&A provisions: greater legal 
protection or legalized protectionism? 
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The decision making process under the Exon-Florio provision is fundamentally 
different. At the end of an investigation, CFIUS produces an opinion on whether there 
is credible evidence to believe that the foreign interest exercising control might take 
action that threatens to impair the national security and whether other provisions of 
law may provide relief.55 Its report and opinion to the President is non-binding.56 The 
President then has 15 days to consider the opinion and “take such action … as the 
President considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any acquisition, merger, or 
takeover, of a person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.” 57 In 
practice, CFIUS has initiated little investigations. Of the 1,593 investigations it has 
received since 1988, CFIUS has only proceeded to make 25 investigations.58 The 
reason for this is that the parties mostly reach a mitigation agreement with CFIUS 
before the investigation. 59 Nonetheless, such data must be used cautiously. Many 
transactions were abandoned after informal negotiations led the parties to conclude 
that there would be no CFIUS approval.60
Comparing the two decision-making processes, the following conclusion can be 
drawn. The process is more bureaucratic under the 2006 Provisions, requiring the 
 
 
                                                 
55 50 U.S.C. §2170(e)  
 
56 Apart from the nine members, The Secretary of Labor and the Director of National Intelligence 
also serve as ex officio members of the Committee. In addition, the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and the 
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counter terrorism may observe, participate and 
report to the President 
 
57 50 U.S.C. §2170(d) ; 31 C.F.R. §800.601 
 
58  Edward M. Graham and David M. Marchick, U.S. National Security and Foreign Direct 
Investment, at p. 57 
 
59 Ibid., at p. 58  
 
60 Ibid., at p. 57 
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consensus of six governmental agencies. This makes it difficult for a transaction to be 
approved. An example can be seen in the proposed merger between Carlyle Group 
and a subsidiary of the Xugong Group. Carlyle made three separate attempts to merge 
with the company but refused was approval each time. The difficulty in negotiating 
with numerous administrative bodies and the delays eventually forced Carlyle to pull 
out of the deal. In contrast, historical data seems to suggest that it is easier for a 
transaction to be approved in the United States. The greater use of informal 
agreements along with a more efficient negotiation process (negotiation with only one 
government body) allows parties to satisfy CFIUS demands more easily.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
 
China’s national security laws do not differ greatly with the United States national 
security laws. In terms of substantive law, there are considerable similarities in the 
definition of “national security” and the remedies available. In fact, the scope of 
review seems to be wider under the Exon-Florio provision than the 2006 Provisions. 
Under the Exon-Florio provision, the definition of the target entity is not limited to 
domestic companies and extends to any entity engaging in interstate commerce. It is 
therefore wrong to argue that China’s substantive rules are more protectionist than 
those in free market countries such as the United States. The only protectionist feature 
of China’s national security law is its decision making procedure. The requirement of 
unanimous approval and the difficulty in negotiating with all six government 
departments makes it harder for a deal to be approved. Despite this, China’s national 
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security law is not as “draconian” as some commentators have suggested. 61
                                                 
61 See Ed Morissey, Is China now more capitalist than the US?, HOT AIR, December 11 2008  
 
 It is 
simply inaccurate to candidly label China’s national security laws as protectionist in a 
comparative context. 
 
